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RACIAL PURGES
Robert L. Tsai*
THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION, AND THE MAKING OF THE
ALIEN IN AMERICA. By Beth Lew-Williams. Cambridge and London:
Harvard University Press. 2018. Pp. 244. $24.95.
INTRODUCTION
On the rainy morning of November 3, 1885, some 500 armed white
men visited the home and business of every single Chinese person living
in Tacoma, Washington. As the skies wept, the mob roused all 200 of
them, including women, children, and the elderly, and marched them
through the mud to the outskirts of town. Those who could afford a
ticket were seen off on the next train. Those who could not make fare
had to keep walking in the hope of seeking refuge in Portland, nearly
150 miles to the south. The next day, Chinese-owned businesses and
homes were set on fire to ensure that the people driven out would not
feel welcome to return.
In The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America, historian Beth Lew-Williams1 recounts this horrific episode (pp. 96–102), along with several others, in clear prose and with
impressive insight. She offers a “transcalar history”—a deep dive into
the Chinese experience in America on multiple levels at once: local, national, and international (p. 10). Lured to the United States by the gold
rush, most Chinese migrants quickly learned that their hope for instant
wealth was little more than a fleeting dream (p. 23). Most wound up
having to take low-paying jobs in agriculture, manufacturing, and the
service industry (p. 35). This sudden, increased integration along economic and spatial dimensions turned out not to be what the Chinese migrants or many white Americans expected or wanted, and a volatile mix
of racism, economic jealousy, and cultural difference caused enormous
political upheaval (pp. 35–39). Waves of nativist politics and organized
terror ensued as white Americans resisted national policies that favored
free migration, enforced notions of white supremacy, and demanded
that the federal government settle “the Chinese Question” (pp. 40–43).

* Clifford Scott Green Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law, Temple University’s Beasley School of Law (Fall 2019); Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. My thanks to Sara Douki, Hermine Duplany, Andrew Lanham, Sarah
McDonald, Sophia Montgomery, and the staff of the Michigan Law Review for their fine
editorial assistance.
1. Associate Professor of History, Princeton University.
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Until Congress solved the problem, white citizens would do the job by
displacing Chinese migrants from communities where they were not
wanted. As they did so, they justified their actions through the higher
law tradition.2
What happened in Tacoma wasn’t a spontaneous or isolated occurrence. To the contrary, it was part of a series of Chinese removals that
were intentional and systematic, organized not just by vigilantes acting
alone but also by leading figures within each community (p. 115). Local
residents worked with others in a network of loosely affiliated but intensely motivated social groups that operated up and down the West
Coast (p. 118). Before the group of men executed a plan of expulsion in
Tacoma, there were mass meetings led by Mayor Jacob Weisbach to discuss what to do about the Chinese (p. 122), who wore strange garb, adhered to odd customs, and could live on very little.3 Local newspapers
like the Tacoma Ledger whipped citizens into a frenzy, warning of “this
gigantic invasion of chinamen . . . captained by a few American mandarins.”4
This method of social reordering through a brutal form of immigration localism5 (today we would call it ethnic cleansing6) became portable, as one city after another emulated the strategy. Indeed, Tacoma’s
successful purge of its Chinese residents led others to dub it “the Tacoma method” and portray it as a “peaceful” solution (p. 124). Elsewhere,

2. See, e.g., George Dudley Lawson, The Tacoma Method, 7 OVERLAND MONTHLY
234, 235 (1886) (“An appeal to the higher law of self-preservation was determined upon,
and the Chinese were asked to ‘go.’ ”).
3. Let Him Preach to Empty Benches, DAILY LEDGER, Oct. 13, 1985, at 1. Not everyone supported the planned expulsion. One of the few who spoke out against rising antiChinese sentiment was Rev. W.D. McFarland, who found himself later denounced by the
local newspaper as “a pro-Chinese fanatic of the most bigoted sort.” Id.
4. Jules Alexander Karlin, The Anti-Chinese Outbreak in Tacoma, 1885, 23 PAC.
HIST. REV. 271, 273 (1954).
5. More recent accounts of immigration localism have emphasized its progressive
potential, but for every Sheriff Sally Hernandez there is a Sheriff Joe Arpaio. See, e.g.,
Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Essay, Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2019). Power, once recognized, can’t be so easily cabined within formal, or even legal, limits.
6. Ethnic cleansing hasn’t been formally recognized as an independent crime under international law but could be subsumed within “crimes against humanity.” U.N. Secretary-General, Comm’n of Experts, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), ¶¶ 72–74, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May
27, 1994). The term emerged after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and has been
defined as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to
remove persons of given groups from the area” or “a purposeful policy designed by one
ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian
population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.” Id. ¶¶
129–30 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Comm’n of Experts, Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), ¶ 55,
U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993)).
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expulsions were preceded by beatings, shootings, murders, or lynchings.
But whether lives were lost or not, social relationships were consistently disrupted, fear and anger were plentiful, and almost always Chinese
property was dismantled, destroyed, or set ablaze as part of the ritual
purification. Lew-Williams observes that from 1885–1886, 168 different
communities in America expelled the Chinese (p. 1).
Lew-Williams’s magisterial account of the injustices perpetrated
against the Chinese is extremely generative on several fronts. The first is
historical: she seeks to correct a national narrative that often leaves out
the horrors instigated against the Chinese community while emphasizing emancipated slaves and native populations as the primary victims of
racial violence (pp. 3–5). Her account of Chinese “resistance and flight in
the face of white violence” successfully complicates that story (p. 95)
and, along the way, deepens our understanding of American constitutional law’s development. In Part I of this Review, I emphasize that antiChinese violence was extremely effective as a political tool. Perpetrators
faced almost no legal repercussions, and unlike for freed persons, racial
violence didn’t lead to significant legislation that benefited the Chinese.
Judicial rulings were mixed: the recognition of birthright citizenship
was a high point, but rulings that endorsed exclusion as a national policy and recycled theories of cultural incompatibility proved damaging.
Along a second trajectory, The Chinese Must Go raises troubling questions about America’s tradition of popular sovereignty. In Part II, I assess this wave of anti-Chinese mobilization—from aggressive boycotts
to lynchings to armed expulsions—which were justified by perpetrators
and observers alike according to America’s higher law tradition. Finally,
in Part III, I use the local expulsions of Chinese migrants as a springboard to build a more complex portrait of inequality in America so that
we might remedy it more effectively. I do so by sketching a typology of
the different forms that inequality can take and explaining where racial
purges fit among them. What we discover when we study inequality this
way is how motivations, justifications, and consequences tend to cluster
in new patterns.
All three lines of inquiry are worth pursuing if we wish to make
progress on inequality today. We need to better understand our past,
we need to figure out exactly how political and legal traditions have justified both cruelty and liberation, and we need to adjust our existing
toolbox for attacking the various forms that inequality takes.
I.

CHINESE REMOVALS IN HISTORICAL TIME

Lew-Williams’s remarkable work sheds light on how Americans reconsidered their fundamental values to justify mass expulsions. Those
questions are back on the national stage, after voters catapulted Donald
Trump to the Oval Office on the strength of rhetoric that demonized
Hispanic migrants and plans to block Muslim travelers and refugees
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from coming to the United States.7 Exclusion was the preferred patois of
Trump and his most ardent supporters.
Of course, it’s not just Trump who’s engaged in this debate. Many
Americans have good-faith questions about the right amount of immigration for American prosperity and security. Even so, roundups of undesirables, the separation of loved ones, and population purges again
occupy a major part of this conversation. On such matters, the political
and legal responses to the so-called Chinese question during the nineteenth century yielded plentiful material for both sides of today’s immigration debate to work with. Those who favor unfettered migration and
a cosmopolitan vision of community lament the Chinese Restriction and
Exclusion Acts,8 along with other techniques historically deployed to deter unwanted populations. By contrast, proponents of tough immigration restrictions and theories of cultural integrity find these older ideas,
strategies, and laws worth dusting off—tidied up if possible—and reused.
More recently, in July 2019, University of Pennsylvania law professor Amy Wax generated headlines at a convention on conservative nationalism when she made the case for an immigration policy based on a
theory of “cultural-distance nationalism.”9 To Wax, who ridiculed the

7. See, e.g., John Fritze, Trump Used Words Like ‘Invasion’ and ‘Killer’ to Discuss
Immigrants at Rallies 500 Times: USA Today Analysis, USA TODAY (Aug. 8, 2019, 4:46 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/08/trumpimmigrants-rhetoric-criticized-el-paso-dayton-shootings/1936742001/
[https://perma.cc/RH4E-DXPH]; Jessica Taylor, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete
Shutdown of Muslims Entering’ U.S., NPR (Dec. 7, 2015, 5:49 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2015/12/07/458836388/trump-calls-for-total-and-completeshutdown-of-muslims-entering-u-s [https://perma.cc/HLG3-7J47] (reporting Trump’s
claim that Muslims have “great hatred” of America); Julia Carrie Wong, Trump Referred to
Immigrant ‘Invasion’ in 2,000 Facebook Ads, Analysis Reveals, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2019, 5:58
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/05/trump-internet-facebookads-racism-immigrant-invasion [https://perma.cc/K2E8-EQND].
8. This is sometimes popularly known as the “Chinese Exclusion Act,” but
throughout this Review I’ll go with the original name given to the law and reserve the
1888 law as the Chinese Exclusion Act, as Lew-Williams has done.
9. Zack Beauchamp, Amy Wax, “National Conservatism,” and the Dark Dream of a
Whiter America, VOX (July 23, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/7/23/20679172/amy-wax-white-national-conservatism-yoram-hazonyracism [https://perma.cc/9CMM-VN3X]; Osita Nwanevu, Conservative Nationalism Is
Trumpism
for
Intellectuals,
NEW
YORKER
(July
21,
2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/conservative-nationalism-is-trumpismfor-intellectuals [https://perma.cc/JPW5-NCGP]. Wax’s presentation was based on an
earlier law review article. That essay is framed as one where she criticizes the language
used to talk about immigration, but it’s obvious that she is a proponent of culturaldistance nationalism. She criticizes “creedal nationalism” for ignoring differences in immigrants’ ability to assimilate, defends cultural-distance nationalists for “wanting to limit
the influx of non-Western peoples,” praises Steve Bannon’s techniques for encouraging
“self-deportation” for achieving this second vision in America, and ridicules equality and
human rights as a progressive preoccupation with “niceness.” Amy L. Wax, Debating Im-
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prevailing liberal-pluralist ideology that a person from anywhere can
easily assimilate to American culture, it made perfect sense to limit migration from those countries whose traditions seem distant from those
of the United States, even if it meant “in effect . . . taking the position that
our country will be better off with more whites and fewer nonwhites.”10
Elsewhere, she has written: “[W]e must ensure that bad habits from the
Third World—lack of respect for law, rampant corruption and kleptocracy, despotism, weak markets, insecure property rights, lassitude,
lack of enterprise, tribalism, superstition, distrust, rampant violence,
misogyny, and unreason—are not allowed to infect and undermine the
First.”11 To Wax’s detractors, this approach smacked of older, racist approaches to migrants and is at odds with the mid-1960s political settlement that emphasizes civil rights, along with immigration and
naturalization policy that doesn’t presume cultural incompatibility between nonwhite migrants and America’s civic tradition.
While Lew-Williams is not the first to do so,12 she powerfully illustrates that arguments that migrants pose a threat of moral contagion
and political domination go way back. Specifically, she observes that
“Chinese exclusion and the modern American alien emerge[d]” at the
same time (p. 236). Seen in this light, Wax’s proposal to save America’s
Western character through demographic controls that differentiate
among countries of origin, Samuel Huntington’s vision of clashing civilizations,13 and even the Trump-Miller-Bannon view of “American carnage” wrought by foreign powers14 all can be traced to the ideological
ferment of Chinese exclusion. That rhetoric has certainly been updated
to incorporate Hispanic and Muslim migrants, but its basic structure has
largely survived intact—and so have the associated policies.

migration Restriction: The Case for Low and Slow, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 851–62
(2018).
10. Beauchamp, supra note 9 (quoting Wax).
11. Wax, supra note 9, at 860.
12. See, e.g., ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE
EXCLUSION ACT (1998); ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE
EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 (2003); JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR
AGAINST CHINESE AMERICANS (2007).
13. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996). In crasser and more alarmist form, these ideas have appeared in the popular writings of conservative thinkers like Pat Buchanan and Ann Coulter. See, e.g., PATRICK
J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS
IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILIZATION (2002); ANN COULTER, ¡ADIOS, AMERICA!: THE LEFT’S
PLAN TO TURN OUR COUNTRY INTO A THIRD WORLD HELLHOLE (2015).
14. In President Trump’s First Inaugural Address, he recapitulated a number of
ethnonationalist themes from his campaign: “We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our
jobs.” President Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/
[http://perma.cc/ZD98-45S3].
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The curious thing about the Chinese is that, unlike the four million
slaves who suddenly gained citizenship rights after the Civil War and
rose to political power in a number of communities, they didn’t pose any
serious electoral threat before the repression began because they
weren’t allowed to vote (p. 228). Chinese people were already barred by
federal law from becoming naturalized citizens, and even at the high
point of Chinese migration, they still composed a fraction of the population. Yet as Lew-Williams shows, their mere presence raised the specter
of white citizens being conquered by outsiders (p. 6). The rhetoric of
yellow domination mobilized white people to take preemptive action to
arrest further assimilation (pp. 6–9), reverse the social and economic
integration that had taken place, and preempt the possibility of political
equality—or foreign domination.15
In an early chapter, Lew-Williams analyzes a work of fiction titled
Last Days of the Republic, published in 1880.16 That book described the
Chinese as not only culturally unassimilable but also as a barely hidden
threat to American empire (p. 28). What begins as the description of the
Chinese as a “race alien alike to every sentiment and association of
American life” eventually gives way to “treachery.”17 The mostly Chinese
men who arrive on America’s shores actually constitute a secret army,
and when they eventually gain citizenship followed by the right to vote,
they quickly elect people of Chinese ancestry to key civic positions
(p. 29). And when Chinese armies finally land in South Carolina, that
merely signals the last days of the republic, for civilization had already
crumbled from within.18
Last Days of the Republic wove together civic republicanism’s preoccupation with political decay, white nationalist sentiment, and an
emerging obsession with demographic control. Its portrayal of immigration captured widely shared cultural stereotypes about Chinese people
and conspiratorial fears of the “alien crown” (p. 29). Yet such views
stood in sharp contrast from the perspective of American elites at the
time. Those “cosmopolitan elites,” portrayed as rapacious businessmen
and servile politicians by anti-Chinese forces, welcomed migration from
China initially because they believed that a new source of foreign labor
would actually lift up the status of white workers and facilitate rapid
empire building.19 This early national policy was reflected in treaties
15. For more on white fears of becoming a minority in America, see Robert L. Tsai,
Specter of a White Minority, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 3, 2018), https://lareviewofbooks.org
/article/specter-of-a-white-minority/ [https://perma.cc/5HMK-QCDC].
16. P.W. DOONER, LAST DAYS OF THE REPUBLIC (1880).
17. Pp. 28–30 (quoting DOONER, supra note 16, at 27, 202).
18. P. 29. The use of fiction to disseminate notions of American community, including visions of white sovereignty, is nothing new. See ROBERT L. TSAI, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN
CONSTITUTIONS 236–37, 267–74 (2014).
19. Pp. 6, 11, 138–39. William Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State, exemplified this
policy on free migration. Opening America to the Chinese, he thought, was necessary to
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that protected the rights of the subjects of China while they sojourned in
America (pp. 28, 271 n.36).
Almost immediately, populist movements arose to defend the rights
of “white labor” against the “coolies” (or “semi-slaves”) and drive people
of Chinese ancestry from America’s shores (pp. 31–36). If freed blacks
and indigenous nations represented populations that could be assimilated as full citizens, the Chinese came to signify the perpetual noncitizen during this same period—what Lew-Williams calls “the
quintessential alien in America.”20 California, Oregon, and Washington
Territory spearheaded laws that would “protect free White labor” and
discourage Chinese migration (pp. 42–43).
Many of these laws resulted from the efforts of the Workingmen’s
Party, which employed nationalistic, xenophobic, and racist rhetoric in
its appeals to white citizens (pp. 40–43). Local and regional media also
played a major role in casting people of Chinese ancestry as “invaders.”
In a precursor to Kris Kobach’s efforts to make life in America so inhospitable for migrants that they leave voluntarily,21 a number of jurisdictions enacted laws preventing the Chinese from owning property,
imposed unfair and burdensome taxes, barred corporations from hiring
people of Chinese ancestry, and refused licenses to fish or operate businesses (p. 43).
National political parties were forced to heed this desire for exclusion. Local expulsions and oppressive regulations eventually blossomed
into a national policy of exclusion (pp. 43–45). This entire pattern of political action “accelerated Chinese segregation in the U.S.,” stimulated
migration to the eastern parts of the country, and “hastened return migration to China,” Lew-Williams writes (p. 8). The groundswell of antiChinese sentiment led to the renegotiation of treaty obligations, which
allowed the United States to regulate and even suspend Chinese migraprying open China to “white labor” and American goods. In turn, “cheap” Chinese labor
would be helpful to development in Western states. Pp. 24–27.
20. P. 8; see also LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006).
21. Prominent anti-immigration activist and former Kansas Secretary of State Kobach has described a proposal of “attrition through enforcement.” Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 155 (2008). “What if every illegal alien found it difficult to obtain employment in
the United States and the risks of enforcement (including the possibility of detention during removal hearings) were to increase for all?” he asks. Id. at 157. To implement his vision, Kobach has helped states and local jurisdictions enact a raft of novel laws that
criminalize many aspects of life for undocumented migrants. He has bragged that “[i]f we
had a true nationwide policy of self-deportation, I believe we would see our illegal alien
population cut in half at a minimum very quickly.” He says he doesn’t wish “to do it at
gunpoint” but instead make it so they will “go home on their own volition, under their
own will, pick their own day, get their things in order and leave. That’s a more humane
way.” Jefferson Morley, The Man Behind Romney’s “Self-Deportation” Plan, SALON (Feb. 23,
2012,
3:44
AM),
https://www.salon.com/2012/02/22/the_man
_behind_romneys_self_deportation_dreams/ [https://perma.cc/PL6N-AKGR].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429447

8

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1

tion (pp. 47–51), and eventually pushed President Chester Arthur to
sign the Chinese Restriction Act, which suspended the entry of Chinese
laborers for ten years—the first major national restriction of immigration.22 Lew-Williams’s ability to tell a coherent narrative while showing
how local actors on both sides of the Chinese question tried to navigate
politics at all levels of government is a special achievement of the book.
In a lively section analyzing the enforcement of the federal restriction law in the Pacific Northwest, Lew-Williams recounts the adventures of a customs inspector named Arthur Blake who hunted for
unauthorized Chinese migrants near Puget Sound (pp. 66–68). At that
time, Port Townsend and Seattle were key ports of entry. Deputy Blake
had trouble distinguishing between authorized and unauthorized migrants, so he tried to institute an ad hoc paperwork system that relied
on the assistance of employers. He also cultivated a network of informants, deputized private parties to make arrests, and offered bounties
(pp. 67–79). This vivid portrait of nascent bureaucracy-building through
enforcement practices is a valuable contribution to the literature.
Paradoxically, Lew-Williams thinks that “[f]ederal officials had encouraged a form of vigilantism” by enlisting the help of private citizens
to enforce the northern border (p. 88). She believes that the original
strategy of Chinese restriction failed because it gave the impression that
the federal government would do something to stem the flow of Chinese
migrants but that the government never devoted sufficient resources to
meet the challenge (pp. 87–88). This not only heightened expectations
of closed borders beyond what was realistic, it also meant that when
those expectations of demographic control were dashed by shifts in the
federal government’s priorities, anti-immigration forces chomped at the
bit to take the law into their own hands.
In fact, when thirty-seven Chinese workers showed up in Squak Valley on September 7, 1885, a group of white and Native American men
attacked the camp, shooting into tents and leaving three dead and many
others wounded (p. 82). Acts of open terror like this seemed to galvanize local communities who wished to settle the Chinese question definitively, but those who recoiled from blatant violence searched for
answers that fell short of outright murder or beatings. Some antiChinese activists were content to engage in boycotts and send petitions
to elected officials, while others settled upon a form of mobbing that involved some notice and restraint.23

22. Pp. 48–51. President Hayes had vetoed a harsher law that would have suspended Chinese migration broadly for twenty years and imposed passport and registration requirements on Chinese migrants. Pp. 46–48. What President Arthur later signed
was a compromise. Pp. 49–51. This law would later be extended for another ten years
before it expired, and then made permanent in 1902. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 292,
335. The Chinese restriction laws were not repealed until 1943. Id. at 346.
23. Pp. 128–30. On “mobbing” as a feature of America’s constitutional tradition, see
PAUL A. GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA (1996); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
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According to Lew-Williams, white citizens toggled between open violence against migrants and more sophisticated strategies of expulsion
in part because unrestrained tactics brought unwanted attention from
state and federal authorities and sometimes divided the white community, especially along class lines (pp. 45–52). The Chinese occasionally
fought back in the streets, but most of the time they sought the aid of the
legal profession and well-placed businessmen (p. 94). In entreaties to
politicians and diplomats, they invoked their legal status as subjects of
China—“most favored nation”—to gain allies to fight back against white
mobs, convince state or federal authorities to intervene, or demand reparations (p. 94).
In Tacoma, for example, the expulsion plan began with mass meetings as anti-Chinese forces tried to secure local support. Notices were
subsequently posted throughout Chinatown demanding that the Chinese depart by November 1, 1885 (pp. 96–97). This convinced many
transient laborers to flee, but as Lew-Williams points out, Chinese merchants had more financial investments to protect and believed that their
greater social integration would allow them to survive racial tensions
and insulate them from any reprisals (pp. 96–98). They miscalculated.
Community leaders chose to rapidly escalate their efforts to uproot
these more established members of society.
*

*

*

Although her focus is not on the courts, Lew-Williams’s book nevertheless enriches our appreciation of late nineteenth-century cases involving migrants. One such case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,24 in which the
Supreme Court vindicated the constitutional rights of a Chinese laundry
operator. After reading The Chinese Must Go, one has a better sense of
the tumult faced by judges who had to manage not only the priorities of
the federal government and the enduring interests of justice but also the
realities of cultural discontent. There are some notable bright spots
when judges vindicated the constitutional rights of migrants, but their
willingness to endorse a vision of permanent foreignness remains a major blemish—one that has cast a long shadow over how American law
treats nonwhite migrants.
What we know from the Yick Wo case itself is precious little: the city
of San Francisco adopted an ordinance that required laundromat operators to obtain a permit if the building they would be operating from was
not built of brick or stone.25 While race neutral, the law had the effect of
forcing every Chinese laundromat operator to apply for a license be-

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 27 (2004); and David Grimsted, Rioting
in Its Jacksonian Setting, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 361 (1972).
24. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
25. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356.
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cause they happened to work in wooden structures, and all of the Chinese applicants were summarily denied.26 Meanwhile, operators of
laundries in brick and stone buildings—who were mostly white—got a
pass from the law and continued business as usual.
Lee Yick challenged the refusal of his permit on equality grounds
and won. The ordinance was couched in terms of public health and cleverly did not mention the Chinese at all. In many other situations, judges
have been confounded by such seemingly neutral laws. But in Yick Wo,
the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about whether the ordinance
actually served the needs of public order, implying that it might have
been designed for nefarious purposes. Even more surprising, the justices took the extra step of finding that an unconstitutional motive—
hostility to the person’s race and national origin—infected local decisions in enforcing the law, and they inferred animus from the lopsided
enforcement of the law.
On top of that, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment, originally formulated primarily with the plight of freed persons in mind, extends rights to foreign “persons” on American soil.27 That meant that
while American law might deny Chinese migrants certain kinds of rights
like those closely associated with U.S. citizenship (federal law at that
time limited naturalization to whites), they could still enjoy enforceable
rights to life, liberty, and property as noncitizens. These were all crucial
developments in constitutional law apart from recognizing that a treaty
can create rights enforceable in federal court. But despite this ringing
vindication of constitutional rights, the ruling left much discretion in the
hands of state and local authorities, for there was no due process right
to enforce, for instance, if state law didn’t already recognize that someone had a property interest.
Lew-Williams mentions this case only in passing, but the widespread nature of anti-Chinese hostility she documents throughout The
Chinese Must Go must have been such common knowledge that it influenced judges’ thinking about the law. In fact, while there is almost no
direct discussion of the xenophobic times in Yick Wo itself, the circuit
judge who presided over the dispute below did perceive the permit regulation as a means of ingeniously effectuating the banishment of the
Chinese from the area. Circuit Judge Sawyer wrote:
The effect of the execution of this ordinance in the manner indicated in
the record would seem to be necessarily to close up the many Chinese
laundries now existing, or compel their owners to pull down their present buildings and reconstruct of brick or stone; or to drive them outside the city and county of San Francisco, to the adjoining counties,
beyond the convenient reach of customers,—either of which results
would be little short of absolute confiscation of the large amount of

26.
27.

Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 369.
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property shown to be now, and to have been for a long time, invested
in these occupations.28

In fact, Sawyer said that the goal of local leaders to effectively expel the
Chinese by destroying their livelihood was well known.
That it does mean prohibition, as to the Chinese, it seems to us must be
apparent to every citizen of San Francisco who has been here long
enough to be familiar with the course of an active and aggressive
branch of public opinion and of public notorious events. Can a court be
blind to what must be necessarily known to every intelligent person in
the state?29

He answered his own question by taking judicial notice of racial purges
that were happening contemporaneously.
Still, why the discrepancy between the lower court’s account, which
is compatible with the richer history uncovered by Lew-Williams, and
the more buttoned-down Supreme Court opinion? Perhaps the lowerkey tone taken in the higher court’s ruling was to avoid fanning the
flames of anti-Chinese sentiment. If so, the decisionmaking processes on
the high court somehow worked to understate the extent of racial violence, whereas the judges closer to the ground seemed more motivated
to record those abuses. Whatever the case, given the sophisticated
method of legal expulsion attempted there—not through vigilantism but
through a process that’s infinitely harder to detect because it relies on
the discretion of local bureaucrats—this seems like a missed opportunity by the Supreme Court to fully document and brush back such forms of
inequality.
There is another case that illustrates the effect of judges closer to
the ground, who might have had first- or second-hand knowledge of anti-Chinese mobilization. Justice Stephen Field, who hailed from California, handled a challenge to a law aimed at the Chinese while riding
circuit.30 Ho Ah Kow wound up in jail because he violated a San Francisco ordinance that required at least 500 cubic feet of space for each person in a dwelling.31 The migrants typically lived in close quarters to be
able to save enough to send money back to loved ones in China.32 The
moment he was arrested, Ho Ah Kow faced the prospect of losing all his
hair, which he wore in a traditional pigtail, because a separate law required the sheriff to shave the head of anyone he detained.33

28. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 474 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886). On the widespread use of zoning
laws to push Chinese restaurants out of business, see Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, The
War Against Chinese Restaurants, 67 DUKE L.J. 681 (2018).
29. Wo Lee, 26 F. at 475.
30. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 20 Alb. L.J. 250 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
31. Id. at 250–51.
32. See pp. 21–24.
33. Ho Ah Kow, 20 Alb. L.J. at 251.
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In an amazing ruling, Justice Field found this policy to be a form of
torture constituting “a cruel and unusual punishment” as well as a denial of equal protection of the laws.34 He appeared to see the policy as part
of a wider strategy of expelling the Chinese by humiliating them. “The
ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco,” Field
wrote.35 “This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and was so
understood by everyone. The ordinance is known in the community as
the ‘Queue Ordinance,’ being so designated from its purpose to reach
the queues of the Chinese, and it is not enforced against any other persons.”36
Toward the end of his opinion, Field explicitly mentioned the popular tactic of racial purges. “We are aware of the general feeling—
amounting to positive hostility—prevailing in California against the
Chinese, which would prevent their further immigration hither, and expel from the state those already here,”37 Field wrote. Unfortunately, he
also accepted that the Chinese were unassimilable: “Their dissimilarity
in physical characteristics, in language, manners and religion, would
seem, from past experience, to prevent the possibility of assimilation
with our people.”38 And he stated that restrictions on Chinese migration
were probably justified: “thoughtful persons, looking at the millions
which crowd the opposite shores of the Pacific, and the possibility at no
distant day of their pouring over in vast hordes among us, giving rise to
fierce antagonisms of race, hope that some way may be devised to prevent their further immigration.”39
Field then shifted gears by offering a strong nationalist vision that
left no power over immigration to state and local officials:
We feel the force and importance of these considerations; but the remedy for the apprehended evil is to be sought from the general government, where, except in certain special cases, all power over the subject
lies. To that government belong exclusively the treaty-making power,
and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and . . . the power to prescribe the
conditions of immigration or importation of persons.40

34. Id. at 252.
35. Id.
36. Id. Justice Field is even more explicit in a ruling three years later, saying that
“there now exist, and have existed for years, with the residents of the city and county of
San Francisco, and its citizens and tax-payers, great antipathy and hatred toward the
people of his race.” In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 230 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (striking down licensing scheme requiring applicant to secure recommendation of twelve tax-paying citizens from the block where a laundry was proposed).
37. Ho Ah Kow, 20 Alb. L.J. at 253.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Field thought that further outrages could be avoided by the federal government seizing total control of immigration enforcement. He continued:
The state in these particulars, with those exceptions, is powerless, and
nothing is gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can
never be admitted. . . . [N]othing can be accomplished in that direction
by hostile and spiteful legislation on the part of the State, or of its municipal bodies, like the ordinance in question . . . .41

In this and other cases, federal judges sometimes interpreted federal
law and the U.S. Constitution to defend commercial and diplomatic interests in Chinese migration (pp. 60–62).
Lew-Williams also does not spend much time analyzing the landmark case Wong Kim Ark,42 beyond noting that the justices read the
Fourteenth Amendment to confer citizenship upon the children of Chinese migrants born in the United States even though their parents were
barred from naturalization (p. 228). But it bears explaining how the history and rhetoric of exclusion played a major role in that case. In deciding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizenship language
encompassed the Chinese, the Court cited two legislative discussions
that referenced the children of Chinese migrants.43 Both times, proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, which was modeled on that law, acknowledged that under the
provision “the child of an Asiatic is just as much a citizen as the child of a
European.”44
That Chinese migrants came up during these debates was crucial to
convincing judges to resist a tendency that had emerged to limit the interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments to freed persons despite the Amendments’ broad language. In other words, through a
perverse stroke of luck, Chinese migration had become so controversial
that this vulnerable population’s oppression percolated into constitutional debate. Drafters had a chance to exclude people of Chinese ancestry or migrants generally from the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment but chose not to do so.
Representative Cowan of Pennsylvania objected twice to the proposed language of birthright citizenship, the first time exclaiming, “The
children of German parents are citizens; but Germans are not Chinese.”45 He also alluded to negative sentiment on the West Coast in a
41. Id. This position would be crystalized as the “plenary power” doctrine, giving
Congress power to regulate immigration to the exclusion of the states. See Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
42. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
43. Id. at 697–98.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 697. It wasn’t lost on the Court that a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that denied birthright citizenship to the Chinese would also harm the children of

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3429447

14

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 118:1

failed bid to get the Chinese explicitly excluded from the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Cowan said,
I do not know how my honorable friend from California looks upon
Chinese, but I do know how some of his fellow-citizens regard them. I
have no doubt that now they are useful, and I have no doubt that within proper restraints, allowing that State and the other Pacific States to
manage them as they may see fit, they may be useful; but I would not
tie their hands by the Constitution of the United States so as to prevent
them hereafter from dealing with them as in their wisdom they see
fit.46

Drawing on these exchanges, the justices explicitly subordinated laws
restricting Chinese migration to the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
allowing their racial views to shape judicial interpretation of the provision. The crucial effect was that birthright citizenship could not be altered by Congress.
For the dissenters, Justices Fuller and Harlan, laws meant to restrict
Chinese migration merely recognized the inalterably foreign nature of
Chinese people: even those born in America were nothing more than
“aliens by descent, but born on our soil.”47 In their view, “[t]he right of a
nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized or
taken any steps toward becoming citizens of a country, is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into
the county.”48 They then recycled earlier language that justified treating
the children of Chinese noncitizens differently from other children on
cultural grounds: they comprise “a distinct race and religion, remaining
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our
institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people,
might endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests.”49
Proponents of cultural or racial nationalism had lost the debate on that
day, but the battle was just beginning.
II.

EXPULSION AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

What civic leaders did in cleansing Tacoma of the Chinese was
praised by George Dudley Lawson in the Overland Monthly as “the Ta-

European migrants. “To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of
other countries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch,
Irish, German or other European parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.” Id. at 694.
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id. at 706.
48. Id. at 726 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 731.
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coma method.”50 He described it as nothing more than the age-old practice of “expel[ling] intruders or exile obnoxious members” of society, a
somewhat drastic move, but one that could be justified according to “the
higher law of self-preservation.”51 The power to remove undesirables
was explicitly defended on grounds of popular sovereignty and mutual
self-defense. Lawson wrote,
The Tacoma method is an application of the principle that all of the
rights of the people cannot be conditioned or defined in the statute
books . . . and that remedies and resorts must be left, in some degree,
to be indicated by emergencies. Every government on the face of the
earth recognizes this principle, and to all communities of the governed
it is a vital one.52

Lawson’s statement was echoed throughout the American West, and
this persistent appeal to popular sovereignty to rationalize these purges
reveals an ugly strain in our political tradition—one that underscores
just how malleable this rhetoric has always been as well as the remarkably broad range of ends that language can be used to promote. On
these occasions, higher law discourse was used to defend everything
from bloodless racial purges to injustices such as threats, racist boycotts, beatings, shootings, destruction of property, and murder.
For her part, Lew-Williams points out that the creative instigators of
these local displacements later felt vindicated by legal decisions that affirmed the country’s power to completely exclude Chinese laborers, especially when those decisions relied on rationales grounded in mutual
self-defense and cultural incompatibility. Even though the Supreme
Court ultimately denied them a formal role in immigration enforcement,53 they believed that they had simply been doing at the grassroots
level what the Court finally said was within the power of Congress to accomplish more comprehensively.
But the fact of the matter was that these citizens never felt the need
to ask for permission before they acted. Their appeal to natural law was
sometimes defended on a theory of political breakdown, or as a response to repeated grievances unheard, or as a kind of interstitial act
neither authorized nor explicitly permitted by the law (Chapter Four).
These purgers were not always consistent in their arguments, but they
generally felt that the scale of the problem was enormous, that there
were exigencies involved, and that when people assembled as they did,

50. Lawson, supra note 2, at 234.
51. Id. at 234–35. Similarly, the Tacoma News called the racial purge a “glorious
victory” and legitimate exercise of the “ ‘indefeasible right’ of a community ‘to purge itself
of obnoxious elements.’ ” Karlin, supra note 4, at 280.
52. Lawson, supra note 2, at 238. At another point, he called what the white residents of Tacoma did to the Chinese as “the local application of Abraham Lincoln’s principle of a government ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ ” Id. at 239.
53. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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they were authorized to supersede any treaty or ordinary law that stood
in the way. Mobilized thus, the community was then capable of carrying
out harsh but necessary measures.
For many white residents, that extralegal form of self-help was explicitly linked to demographic control to preserve white supremacy. Tacoma’s Chinese population had swelled to 800 or so,54 and now its
presence was perceived to be damaging cultural mores and discouraging economic investment in the city. So the people would do what state
and national leaders refused to do—in that sense, this could be understood as an instance of exploiting federalism for the sake of preserving a
racist vision of social order. “[T]he race is an undesirable element, and
should not be allowed to obtain a foothold on our soil,” Lawson insisted,
praising Oregon laws that barred Chinese people from owning property
in the state and recognized the Chinese as “a transitory race.”55 But
Washington’s territorial laws did not recognize this same difference in
the races, and that gave rise to the need for self-help by whites. Lawson
thought removal was justified because the Chinese had “formed a colony
of leeches” and become “a menace to public health and safety.”56 He
claimed that once Tacoma became “one-tenth Chinese,” “conditions
were becoming antagonistic to white occupation.”57 Indeed, he insisted
that “at least nine-tenths of the white residents sympathized entirely
with the movement to make it a white man’s town of peace and plenty.”58
Community leaders had help mobilizing anti-Chinese sentiment.
Along these lines, Lew-Williams shows that the Knights of Labor played
a significant role in the purges (pp. 118–19). Not all union figures were
committed to driving the Chinese out of the country, but key leaders did
see a benefit to organizing white workers around the issue (p. 118). Labor’s influence ratcheted up the sense of economic competition and denied migrants support from working-class white people. In fact, a
number of law enforcement figures belonged to the union, and when it
came time for the purge of Tacoma, they either actively participated in
the removal or refused to come to the aid of the Chinese at their most
desperate hour (pp. 121–23).
As Lew-Williams explains, those who carried out Chinese expulsions
felt they were acting nonviolently (pp. 121–24), and this played a role in
the popularity of the method. Lawson himself argued that “Tacoma is to
be congratulated” because its residents had shown supreme restraint;

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Lawson, supra note 2, at 234.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 234.
Id.
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their actions “escaped even the appearance of riot or violence.”59 At
least their efforts fell short of the talk of extermination that had started
to permeate mass meetings, and they involved no lynchings or fire
bombings.60
Leaders of the purge gave Tacoma’s Chinese residents advance notice, demanding that they go (pp. 96–97). Within two weeks of notices
posted everywhere, Chinatown had emptied by half.61 But that wasn’t
good enough, according to the local paper. “If any are allowed to remain,
others will come,” warned the Tacoma Ledger. Then the metaphor of
ritual purification: “There must be a clean sweep and a thorough application of disinfectant after the sweeping is done” (p. 123).
That final removal of the remaining fifty to one hundred or so migrants, described as “intruders” and “[l]ingering Mongols” (p. 123), was
effectuated in a manner Lawson defended as consistent with “the
recognition and protection of all human rights that could . . . be demanded for any class of men, in its natural and necessary removal from
a community where it had ceased to be useful and had become dangerous, or let us say, only inconvenient.”62 He pointed to the fact that city
and county “peace officers” were involved the entire time and that the
migrants were told they had to leave but would not be hurt.63 Indeed, as
Lew-Williams points out, during the purge the mayor, who was supervising the events, turned and asked the sheriff whether the armed white
citizens were a “mob” (p. 123). The sheriff replied that the men carrying
out the purge were acting within the law, since they were carrying out
the racial purge in an orderly fashion: “Their men [are] orderly and [do]
not demand any interference” (p. 123).

59. Id. at 238; see also 1 HERBERT HUNT, TACOMA: ITS HISTORY AND ITS BUILDERS 373
(1916) (“It was a mob, but an orderly mob as mobs go.”).
60. Jean Pfaelzer documents many of the attacks that occurred against the Chinese
in California. White miners carried out “ruthless evictions” in places like El Dorado County, Placer County, and Shasta County. Throughout the spring and summer of 1852, white
miners attacked the camps of Chinese miners, barred wagons containing their equipment
from entering, and set fire to their tents and tools. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 10–16. In
1858–1859, a race war began when 200 armed white men on horseback rode from camp
to camp, ordering the Chinese to leave the area and give up any claims. A local sheriff
tried to help the Chinese resist these racial purges by arresting vigilantes, but his men
were outnumbered and he had to telegram for help from the governor: “An armed body
of men, 300 strong and increasing, is organized for the purpose of driving the Mongolians
out, in defiance of the law and its officers,” Shasta County Sheriff Clay Stockton wrote. Id.
at 13–16. These same techniques were used against Latin Americans and Native Americans who also came to mine the land. Id. at 17–24. On the life of Chinese miners, see David V. DuFault, The Chinese in the Mining Camps of California: 1848-1870, 41 HIST. SOC’Y S.
CAL. Q. 155 (1959).
61. Lawson, supra note 2, at 235.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 236.
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After “the final exodus” was accomplished, Lawson predicted that
“the removal of the little yellow man, will go far to immortalize the
pleasant city at the head of Puget Sound.”64 As horrific as Lawson’s defense of a racial purge sounds now, it is apparent that his view was
widely shared at the time. White people who carried out the mass removals of Chinese people believed that they were in the right and that
they were behaving within the bounds of higher law—even when doing
so conflicted with federal law or international obligations. They met
publicly, deliberated openly, gave notice before applying force, sometimes offered provisions to those they were displacing, and refrained
from what they felt to be unnecessary violence.
Those responsible for leading the Chinese purges also meant to
send a message to business leaders, elected officials, and judges. Partway through her book, Lew-Williams clarifies that expulsion was distinctively political and communicative: those who carried out the
practice believed they were “broadcast[ing]” demands for legal change
(pp. 116, 133). Her definition of expulsion thus emphasizes its dialogic
role as “a form of violent racial politics, that is, group violence intended
to make a national political statement but meted out against a local racial minority” (p. 116).
And more than one community wanted to send a message. When the
purges made their way to Seattle, federal troops had to be called out
twice (pp. 106–07). Just before the first Seattle purge took place, antiChinese activists met with leading Chinese merchant-contractors to try
to get them to remove themselves. Businessmen who employed Chinese
laborers began to send them away (p. 105). But this concession was not
enough to arrest the logic or momentum of expulsion.
Lew-Williams tells this terrifying chapter of our nation’s history
with brutal honesty, from many perspectives at once, and she doesn’t
give anyone a free pass. In an especially effective part of the book, she
presents a first-hand account of the Chinese expulsions from the point
of view of white citizens who were sympathetic to their suffering (Chapter Five). These figures included Washington Territorial Governor Watson C. Squire and his wife, Ida Squire, and Alexander Farquharson,
owner of a barrel-manufacturing business, who stood his ground and
stopped vigilantes from seizing his Chinese workers (pp. 139, 151–52).
Each of these figures could have been stalwart allies, and some even
came to the aid of migrants in need, but most emerged from these racial
conflicts firmly convinced that only a drastic solution could restore domestic tranquility.
Governor Squire, a transplant from the Northeast, initially believed
that people of Chinese ancestry faced a lot of prejudice (p. 139). But after living through the purges of Seattle, he came to accept “the intense
feeling of antagonism that is seated in the breasts of the great body of

64.

Id. at 234.
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our labouring people in reference to the Chinese” (p. 143). Barely a
month after the events in Tacoma, Squire asked Washington’s Territorial Assembly to petition Congress to end all Chinese migration, saying
that the continued presence of the Chinese spelled the end of “Christian
civilization” (p. 165).
For her part, Ida Squire found the thought of hundreds of Chinese
people “crowded on the wharf—trembling and crying” to be “cruel”
(p. 146). Experiencing the purges, however, shook her to the core. Fear
of the “roughs”—white vigilantes who would not stop at the color line,
but would also attack white allies of the Chinese—led her to want the
migrants gone even though they had made her life more comfortable
(p. 147). This moved her toward tolerating voluntary repatriation, with
the charity of white people willing to help fund the cost of travel to get
Chinese people out of town (pp. 147–48).
Farquharson, who owned a plant in Puyallup, told his Chinese
workers to arm themselves and even went face-to-face with vigilantes
who threatened to burn his factory to the ground (pp. 148–52). His fellow citizens hanged him in effigy (p. 150). Farquharson never turned his
Chinese employees over to the purge committees, but the threats and
disruptions to his business eventually took a toll. He stopped hiring
people of Chinese ancestry and told those on his payroll to move on. As
Lew-Williams tells us, “over the winter of 1885–1886, Farquharson was
among scores of employers who discharged thousands of Chinese
workers from the mines, farms, factories, and railroads of the U.S. West”
(p. 152).
Some white allies did come to the aid of Chinese migrants, but they
faced social ostracism and violence for being “China lover[s]” and “white
Chinamen.”65 In the face of such repercussions for defending racial
equality and opposing violence, many eventually succumbed to the logic
of expulsion on a grander scale, as long as they were not the ones who
had to carry it out.
Lew-Williams’s portrayal of these racial purges complicates our
knowledge of the American political tradition. A great deal of constitutional law scholarship is narrowly (perhaps even selectively) focused on
egalitarian episodes of popular lawmaking: the black civil rights movement, women’s suffrage, Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter.66 But

65. In Whatcom County, Washington, white people who refused to participate in
the purges were derided as “white Chinamen.” Kie Relyea, Remembering Washington’s
Chinese Expulsion 125 Years Later, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 7, 2010, 9:46 AM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/remembering-washingtons-chineseexpulsion-125-years-later [https://perma.cc/QD9H-Q2DB]; see also p. 151 (reporting
that Farquharson was charged with being “a China lover”).
66. Mostly genial accounts of popular sovereignty in America include BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991), and KRAMER, supra note 23. But see MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015); Linda Greenhouse
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once you digest the breadth of local Chinese removals and the rhetoric
that surrounded them, you cannot help but see our tradition more capaciously: popular sovereignty has also been used to license massive acts
of inhumanity and inequality. It is a more accurate picture, even though
it shines the light on some darker corners of popular constitutionalism.
First, the scenes of Chinese expulsions highlight once again the destabilizing nature of popular sovereignty. Not only is it indeterminate
who can legitimately speak for the people, but it is also a deeply contested question when the people may speak. While the script for popular lawbreaking is always the same—significant unaddressed grievances
justify extreme collective measures—the templates for direct action,
which are composed of not just the basic script but also the different
reasons and ends, can be very different. The more portable a particular
template for popular action, the more easily anyone with a grievance
can—by associating with like-minded individuals—claim the authority
to act in the higher law tradition. The same formula that justified a revolutionary break from British rule can also be recycled, as it was here, on
a more local level, for an even more discrete set of complaints.
Second, there is an intrinsic connection between delegitimizing ordinary law and generating a license for violence. The first is done to create space for the second. Relatedly, there is a temptation to overlook the
violence if it is narrow in scope or not as bad as someone else’s past violent act. These fine lines between episodes of violence are all drawn on
the wrong side of the law. To be sure, not every act of lawbreaking is violent. Strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience geared toward legal
transformation all try to thread the needle. But the rhetoric of popular
sovereignty, once engaged, tends to create ever-greater room for forceful action.
Not everyone is willing or able to hold the line. Abolitionist John
Brown offers a cautionary tale. Brown started out cautiously, engaging
in activities on behalf of the Underground Railroad, but once he began
justifying acts of violence according to the higher law tradition, he found
it harder and harder to draw lines that couldn’t later be reset to accommodate more severe acts of force.67 Fighting back against slave catchers
based on a natural law theory of self-defense led to affirmative acts of
slave stealing, whether the enslaved person was ready for liberation or
not. Eventually, his attack on Harper’s Ferry seemed as defensible as
anything else he did before, since there were many individuals and institutions that played some role in the morally bankrupt practice of
slavery. If slavery was really best understood as a “war of one portion of

& Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE
L.J. 2028 (2011).
67. See Robert L. Tsai, John Brown’s Constitution, 51 B.C. L. REV. 151, 176 (2010).
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[the country’s] citizens upon another,” then self-defense could justify
nearly anything.68
Third, popular sovereignty can sometimes be used not to create
permanent institutions, as the framers of new constitutions do, but instead to justify ad hoc organizations—adjuncts to law enforcement, deliberative conventions as alternatives to city or county government—
and then to imbue them with a gloss of legitimacy. These extralegal institutions may exist only for a short time, justified by crisis-like language. Alternatively, they could ripen into other kinds of vigilante
committees or roving militias, seize control of formal offices with the
capacity to do great harm, and even splinter into more lasting forms of
antiegalitarian activity.69
All three of these concerns are amply demonstrated by proponents
of racial purges. In Tacoma, windows were shattered, doors were broken down, and Chinese residents who refused to comply were chased
down and seized. Those who were displaced recall being prodded by
clubs and poles and driven through the streets “like so many hogs”
(p. 101). In Seattle, where racial purges spread next, the pregnant wife
of a Chinese businessman was dragged down the stairs of her home and
into the streets. She ended up losing her child due to the trauma
(p. 107). And yet even when Chinese purges were more violent than
what occurred in Tacoma, perpetrators still felt they were acting nonviolently, exemplifying civic virtue.70
Ad hoc gatherings of agitators seeking support for collective action
against migrants tried to invoke the glorious tradition of the people
meeting out of doors. They met in “conventions” and put together
“committees” (pp. 121–23, 134–35). But it could be hard to tell the difference between virtuous civic gatherings and clandestine vigilante
groups that could hardly be said to represent the broad judgment of an
entire community. And many of the anti-Chinese boycotts involved
threats to life and limb (p. 129).
Perhaps the most troubling thing about Lew-Williams’s account is
that the Chinese purges largely worked. She observes that out-migration

68. TSAI, supra note 18, at 92, 108–17.
69. Along these lines, check out the so-called “Constitutional Sheriffs Movement,”
which also draws on the tradition of popular sovereignty and insists that a county sheriff
is the highest law enforcement officer in that jurisdiction—and has the power to resist
state and federal officers. Two prominent members of this right-wing grassroots movement are Joe Arpaio and David A. Clarke, Jr. See Robert L. Tsai, The Troubling Sheriffs’
Movement
That
Joe
Arpaio
Supports,
POLITICO
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/01/joe-arpaio-pardon-sheriffsmovement-215566 [https://perma.cc/VL27-A3GH]. During his tenure, Arpaio, an elected
official, took it upon himself to begin enforcing federal immigration laws without permission. He was at war with the federal government, immigrants’ rights groups, and even his
own county board of commissioners, which could not restrain him.
70. See pp. 124–25.
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spiked, as the Chinese population in America dropped by 42,437 between 1882 and 1900 (p. 223). California alone experienced a net loss of
30,000 people of Chinese ancestry during the height of the anti-Chinese
movement (p. 223). Worse, with a few exceptions, most perpetrators
got away with it (pp. 132–33). This gave the popular defense of the
method more credence than it deserved. Federal troops intervened in
Seattle before a complete purge could be carried out, and there were a
few cases where resistance by the Chinese momentarily repelled an attack (p. 106). Occasionally, Chinese people fought back against racist
boycotts by arming themselves, engaging in strikes and work slowdowns, and refusing to patronize white businesses involved in such activity.71
But there was never much by way of legal accountability, beyond
negotiated reparations for a handful of racial attacks. In the aftermath of
Tacoma’s expulsion, a U.S. attorney eventually indicted twenty-seven
individuals for insurrection and conspiracy to deprive Chinese people of
equal protection of the laws.72 The defendants were those who played
leadership roles, including the mayor, sheriff, and members of the
chamber of commerce.73 At trial, they defended themselves by arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment could not reach purely private action.74
Somewhat shockingly, the defendants also relied on the Dred Scott decision to argue that some classes of human beings—in this case, the Chinese—should be deemed unprotected by the Constitution since they
could not become citizens.75 Ultimately, the charges were dismissed and
the defendants returned home to a hero’s welcome.76 In Los Angeles,
where seventeen Chinese people were brutally killed by a mob of 500
people, convictions were overturned and charges were never refiled.77
Unfortunately, there was no wave of political sympathy for Chinese
migrants that translated into citizenship or enhanced civil rights for
them. Here, a comparative approach could deepen the bite of LewWilliams’s point. Unlike racial violence against emancipated slaves,
which led to the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871,78 anti-Chinese violence rallied elites to the side of
71. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 39, 176, 183, 234, 260, 265, 267, 285.
72. Id. at 223–24.
73. Id. at 224–25.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 226–27.
76. Id. at 228–29.
77. Id. at 47–53.
78. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—
Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1985); Arturo Peña
Miranda, “Where There Is a Right (Against Excessive Force), There Is Also a Remedy”: Redress for Police Violence Under the Equal Protection Clause, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1678, 1701–
11 (2018); Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 277, 279–80 (1965).
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white supremacy, while leaving Chinese people who remained in America in a state of legal purgatory—a problem for later generations to
solve (Chapter Six).
Local agitators got what they wanted: expulsion on a grander scale.
As Lew-Williams argues, while the wave of anti-Chinese violence was
deplored by many, it had the intended effect of pushing national officials
to side with their white constituents and close the door completely to
Chinese migration (pp. 188–90). The logic was devastatingly simple: it
was safer for everyone involved if they just got rid of them. “These little
mobs rise, but they can not exterminate them, and we can not prevent
it,” declared Democratic senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama.79 “All
we can do is to keep them out of this country.”80 When diplomatic efforts to renegotiate treaty terms with China failed, the United States
moved unilaterally in 1888 to expand the terms of the 1882 Restriction
Act, not only barring Chinese migrants, but also declaring void 30,000
return certificates issued to Chinese people who once lived in the United
States but who had temporarily left the country (pp. 185–93). When the
law went into effect, 600 Chinese travelers were left stranded on the
high seas (p. 192).
In signing the Chinese Exclusion Act, President Cleveland parroted
the rhetoric of anti-Chinese forces across the country, declaring “[t]he
experiment of blending the social habits and mutual race idiosyncracies
of the Chinese laboring classes with those of the great body of the people of the United States . . . to be in every sense unwise, impolitic, and
injurious to both nations.”81 The harsh logic of expulsion, rooted in assertions of cultural incompatibility and driven through a ferocious popular movement, had now truly gone national.
III. TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF INEQUALITY
At the start of her study, Lew-Williams tantalizingly suggests that
our way of thinking about racial violence is stunted because we haven’t
adequately grappled with Chinese removals (pp. 1–3). But how, exactly?
And to what end, beyond understanding the past? Since it is not exactly
fair to demand more from a historian, the rest of us must take the opportunity to wring additional political and legal significance from her
careful work if we wish to capitalize upon this knowledge for the pursuit of justice. To do that, we shall have to put the anti-Chinese racial
purges that occurred in the context of other forms of inequality. When
we do so, we learn that different types of inequality create new arrangements or “clusters” of motivations, actions, and harms.

79.
80.
81.
p. 188.

19 CONG. REC. 8570 (1888) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
Id.
19 CONG. REC. 9052 (1888) (message from President Grover Cleveland); see also
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Much thinking about inequality in America is predicated upon assumptions of uniqueness, that each social group’s struggle has been
special and must be respected.82 The problem is that this isn’t accurate.
The victims of injustice may be different, but the objectives of perpetrators, the nature of their collective actions, and the damage inflicted upon
minority populations can be similar. Worse, the urge to preserve a distinctive memory can get in the way of obtaining justice. Even if we take
white supremacy as a major feature of America’s story, the methods of
maintaining racial dominance have crossed group lines. They have also
morphed over time. As Lew-Williams notes, for instance, the politics of
exclusion deployed against the Chinese was originally engaged against
paupers and drunks, who were perceived to be mostly Irish (pp. 43, 49).
And after the Civil War, communities that experienced an influx of freed
persons—like Tulsa, Oklahoma, whose Greenwood section was known
as “Black Wall Street”83—also sometimes experienced racial purges. In
the same vein, the strategy of imposing unequal taxes to scare away the
Chinese was a technique also used to justify the deportation of Chileans
and Mexicans.84
As I have argued elsewhere,85 fear of comparing experiences can
prevent us from dealing with the full extent of human suffering and inequality. But we have to do it the right way: not to determine some magical threshold below which suffering is simply not seen or remediable;
but rather to see the full complexity of inequality in America. We can’t
just pit one group against another. We must dare to identify commonalities among oppressive practices and the lasting interplay between social
harms.
After all, it’s impossible to move forward unless we have a good
sense of what went wrong. And to operationalize our sense of how
we’ve gone wrong in the past, we’ll have to adjust our legal and historical understanding of inequality in America. In that light, The Chinese
Must Go reveals that majoritarian processes and well-placed supporters
repeatedly failed vulnerable immigrants, even those who were lawfully

82. See, e.g., JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME (1963); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS
FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS (rev. ed. 1998); CORNEL WEST,
RACE MATTERS (1993).
83. “The Greenwood Massacre,” sometimes known as “the Tulsa Riot of 1921,” was
sparked by a white teenage girl’s accusation that a black man had tried to sexually assault
her in an elevator; the charge was later dropped. In the meantime, white mobs demanded
that the accused, then under arrest, be delivered up for rough justice. White mobs rampaged through the black section of town, shooting and looting. It led to hundreds dead,
the arrest of 6,000 black citizens, and thousands of homes and businesses burned to the
ground. See ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921
(2002).
84. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 31.
85. ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION 101–05
(2019).
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present and committed no crimes. And yet our constitutional doctrines
are stunted by an obsession with individualized mistreatment rather
than systematic injuries—even the dream of a post-racial society can
blind us to the intergenerational effects of unequal policies.
Simplistic, cumbersome, or parsimonious notions of equality must
be reconsidered or set aside. That’s because without a good feel for the
subtleties of inequality, legal formulas are uncertain methods for facilitating remedies. In the absence of a richer vision of inequality, the best
we could hope for is that decisionmakers go through the motions and
occasionally hit upon an outcome that does some good. To render meaningful justice, we must find our way toward a more comprehensive catalogue of the forms of inequality, the harms associated with each
historical variety, the reasons for doing something about them, and the
remedies that might be appropriate.
In my view, it makes sense to treat expulsions as a separate form of
inequality. This is a different approach to understanding inequality than
that of many philosophers. For instance, T.M. Scanlon has offered six different reasons one might give for objecting to inequality.86 He says, for
example, that providing public services differently to different people
for no good reason would be a denial of equal concern and that this is a
different sort of objection to inequality than a complaint that something
fosters status inequality or denies procedural fairness.87
My concern here is not to supplant other ways of thinking about inequality but instead to supplement the most useful approaches by
grounding them in historical complexity and improving our capacity to
remedy a broader range of injustices. At the same time, we’ll need to
theorize across moments and experiences so we can recognize commonalities in terms of intentions, consequences, harms, and solutions.
We should start by building a typology of inequalities. Here’s a
sketch:
1.

Slavery

2.

Physical Violence (murder, assault, battery, rape)

3.

Expulsion

4.

Detention

5.

Separation

86. T.M. SCANLON, WHY DOES INEQUALITY MATTER? (2018). Scanlon says there are six
kind of objections to inequality: (1) it creates a humiliating difference in status; (2) it
gives the rich unjustifiable power over those who are not wealthy; (3) it undermines
equality of economic opportunity; (4) it undermines the fairness of political institutions;
(5) it violates the notion of equal concern in distributing benefits; and (6) it arises from
economic institutions that are themselves unfair. Id. at 8–9. Other philosophers emphasize a single principle of “basic equality,” along with some secondary concepts. See, e.g.,
JEREMY WALDRON, ONE ANOTHER’S EQUALS (2017).
87. SCANLON, supra note 86, at 5–7.
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6.

Symbols of Hatred or Hierarchy

7.

Denial of Civil Rights or Fundamental Rights (i.e., voting,
speech, migration, etc.)

8.

Differential Treatment as to Other Social Goods

9.

Destruction of Property and Wealth Disparities

10. Impairment of Economic Opportunity

What do we learn when we treat inequality as a series of distinctive
forms instead of merely reasons for concern? First, we start to see that
the attributes of a particular form of inequality will share a family resemblance, even if they are applied to new groups and fresh circumstances. For instance, the stimulation of hierarchy and hatred, creation
of a homogeneous community, social dislocation and geographic dispersal of undesirables, rise of a nomadic population, total shutdown of local
economic opportunities to the expelled, and deterrence of future inmigration are all consequences shared by racial purges. Indeed, we can
talk about designed rootlessness as a feature, since the idea was to keep
Chinese migrants perpetually on the move in the hope they would eventually decide to wander back to their country of origin. In other words,
local expulsion hopefully encouraged out-migration by reducing economic opportunities and multiplying the kinds of social pain experienced by members of this group.
This set up a self-fulfilling prophesy: already described by antiimmigration forces as outsiders and risks of becoming public charges,
Chinese people would then be forced to become just like vagrants, a
despised category of people in America that traditionally enjoyed fewer
rights than full citizens. After all, the original Articles of Confederation
explicitly excluded “paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives” from the full
privileges and immunities that “free citizens” enjoyed.88 Widespread racial purges transformed a new set of migrants—the Chinese—into more
historically familiar legal outcasts. And since these other groups did not
enjoy the same rights to travel freely within the United States, constructing the Chinese in these terms made it easier to expose them to
different and harsher treatment than other immigrants.
Similarly, this approach helps us to identify a set of related harms
flowing from a particular form of inequality. Each time a racial purge
was carried out, Chinese people experienced a similar set of injuries: a
disruption in their social relationships, forced homelessness, psychological and perhaps physical injuries stemming from experiencing political

88. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. This exception was not
carried over in the U.S. Constitution, and this fact was remarked upon by some—
including John Bingham, principal drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment—as an indicator
of a more expansive belief in equality for all. See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985
(1859).
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terror, vulnerability to further downstream abuse, the loss of economic
investments and future opportunities—just to name a few.
Second, reasons for objecting to a particular kind of inequality can
cluster in particular, historically salient ways. We might object to racial
expulsions for reasons we might not give for other forms of inequality.
Using Scanlon’s terminology as a springboard, it is possible to say that
the expulsion of Chinese migrants expressed animus because it fostered
a humiliating difference in status compared with other immigrants; that
the threat of racial purges and racist boycotts denied them equality of
economic opportunities; that these displacements, when led by state actors like elected officials and law enforcement officers, corroded the
fairness of political institutions meant to serve and protect everyone;
and finally, that the state failed to treat the Chinese with equal concern
because it failed to protect their rights to security and property guaranteed by relevant law.
Third, the approach confirms that racial violence is neither irrational nor unpredictable. Even when it’s believed to be solved, it can reoccur, and when it does, that violence follows certain repeatable forms. To
talk of racial violence as if it were some kind of collective hysteria
wrongly absolves subjects of agency and moral responsibility, and it
underplays the crucial role that tradition and politics play in driving racial terror. In reality, perpetrators behave deliberately, recycling forms
of inequality that served their ends in the past and adjusting strategies
as necessary. In this respect, it isn’t just “the Tacoma Method” that was
portable—all forms of inequality provide templates for future action.
This tells us something else: our reasons and strategies for opposing inequality will have to be just as adaptable.
We can now say a little more about purges as a strategy for fostering inequality. Expulsions have frequently been used to serve white supremacy, but they needn’t be tethered to such an objective. In the years
before immigration policy became a national concern, New York and
Massachusetts rounded up and deported foreign paupers.89 Closer to
our own time, many municipalities have used zoning laws to force people with intellectual disabilities to live outside of populated downtown
areas, raising similar questions of group displacement.90 Also, banish-

89. HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 2–3 (2017). There was actually overlap in how these communities thought about the poor and people with disabilities, for state laws allowed officials to exclude not only aliens “likely to become a public
charge,” but also “lunatics,” “idiots,” and “infirm” persons. Id. at 3.
90. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae of Assoc. for Retarded Citizens et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (No. 84-468), 1985 WL 669791, at *2 (“The states forthrightly and systematically sought to ‘purge society’ of their retarded citizens and by law declared them ‘unfit
for citizenship.’ The Cleburne ordinance, modeled on a 1929 Dallas ordinance, has its
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ment was used to rid a community of interracial couples and drunks,
while zoning techniques have been deployed to remove sex offenders
and homeless people out of sight, out of mind.91
Expulsions can be extralegal measures, as they were in the case of
the Chinese when they were deprived of civil rights guaranteed under
treaties, federal law, and even state law. But expulsions can also be legally authorized, as they were once it became a national policy to keep
out and hunt for unauthorized Chinese migrants, or when indigenous
tribes were systematically deprived of sovereignty and their members
forcibly relocated to reservations.92 Legalized expulsions become almost something else entirely. Once codified and imbued with formal legitimacy, purges become more systematic and efficient. The logic of
exclusion can become unassailable—as we all become accustomed to
regular expulsions as a way of life. Its funding becomes more stable, bureaucracies are built to carry out the removals of the unwanted, an entire segment of society becomes economically and emotionally invested
in an expulsion industry, and the machinery of expulsion can then be
turned against a variety of populations.
Racial expulsions of the sort conducted against the Chinese share
some characteristics with lynchings: they were an extra-legal effort directed against a racial minority, and they were often conducted in a
highly ritualized fashion.93 Just as lynchings in some places became
community-wide events, so, too, racial purges expressed a mixture of
white affinity and patriotic sentiment. The people of Tacoma commemorated the Chinese purge by celebrating it as a holiday one year later,
replete with “a parade and torch light procession.”94 As the Chinese
were being driven out, some citizens stopped and hunted for keepsakes.
It was reported that “white women entered the Chinese shacks and procured souvenirs,”95 already looking ahead to a time when they could
safely, perhaps even wistfully, think back upon Chinese culture. In Los
Angeles, seventeen Chinese men were lynched, their homes were looted

origin in this period and—along with at least twelve similar ordinances in Texas alone—
is rooted in the invidious discrimination of that time.”).
91. See, e.g., Peter D. Edgerton, Banishment and the Right to Live Where You Want,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1023 (2007). As just one example, Virginia’s antimiscegenation law was
deployed to effectuate the banishment of the Lovings. They were sentenced to one year
in jail, with their sentences suspended “on the condition that the Lovings leave the State
and not return to Virginia together for 25 years.” Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
92. See generally Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation:
1830–1976 the United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and
Execution of the Crime of Genocide against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 931
(2002).
93. W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 18801930 (1993).
94. HUNT, supra note 59, at 382.
95. Id. at 373.
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and jewelry taken.96 At times, perpetrators mutilated the bodies of Chinese victims. This happened in places like Los Angeles, Rock Springs,
Snake River, and Hells Canyon.97
An alleged crime by nonwhites against whites could trigger a
broader purge, and sometimes even a lynching, but was not a necessary
component of a racial purge. Lynchings did play a role in the purges of
Chinese residents in places like Denver, Eureka, and Los Angeles. On October 31, 1880, a drunken encounter between several white and Chinese residents in a Denver saloon spilled into the streets.98 As the
Chinese men tried to defend themselves, more white men joined the fracas.99 By nightfall, thousands of angry whites had assembled and seized
the opportunity to burn down every single Chinese laundry in the
city.100 A similar dynamic occurred in Pierce City, Missouri, after the
1901 lynching of two black men accused of crimes against white citizens, when a ringleader hollered, “Come on boys, you with guns—out to
run the niggers out of town.”101 Afterward, black people were warned
that “negroes will not be permitted to live here in the future and that the
few negroes not already expelled will be obliged to go.”102 Likewise, the
grisly scene of disfigured Chinese bodies lying in the streets of Los Angeles or the swinging body of Hong Di, a convicted Chinese murderer
lynched by a mob in Chico (p. 4), signifies the worthlessness of Chinese
lives.
Whiteness is something that must be performed. After a purge was
over, residents would frequently give public testimony as to how glad
they were that Chinese people had been driven out. In Tacoma, one
white woman thanked the men for driving “away the slaves that had
taken the bread from the people’s mouths and from their children’s
mouths.”103 Racial homogeneity restored a perception of harmony, and
that sense of purity had to be acknowledged. The same woman, like
many others, was grateful that women’s “eyes no more meet the unclean Chinamen.”104

96. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 50, 123, 287 (describing how a Chinese doctor “had
his garments ripped from off his person while hanging,” wares were stolen by white
gangs, and a gang of white farmers and schoolboys “rob[bed] and murder[ed]” Chinese
miners).
97. P. 169; PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 287.
98. Roy T. Wortman, Denver’s Anti-Chinese Riot, 1880, 42 COLO. MAG. 275, 280
(1965).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 286.
101. KIMBERLY HARPER, WHITE MAN’S HEAVEN 24–26 (2010).
102. Pierce City Mob Drives Out Negroes, S.F. CALL, Aug. 21, 1901, at 1.
103. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 225.
104. Id.
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White residents of Whatcom County similarly celebrated their racial
purge with a torchlight parade, songs, and fireworks.105 “The Chinese
are gone,” announced the local newspaper. “We rejoice.”106 Fire typically
played a major role in places like Tacoma, Truckee, San Jose, and Rock
Springs—not merely in terrorizing the Chinese but also in purifying the
community.107 The absolute destruction of migrant encampments or the
burning of Chinatown signaled a desire to blot out any positive impact
the migrants had on the community, perhaps along with memories of
the ruthless actions that had to be undertaken by white residents to
erase the interlopers from history. Fire then became a symbolic feature
of post-purge commemorations, as torch-lit processions offered a reenactment of the purification itself.
To the extent that a purge is memorialized or broadcast, it sends a
message of hierarchy and intolerance. This kind of social injury is lasting to the extent others perceive a community is unwelcome to outsiders. And this characteristic renders a purge like other kinds of symbols,
signage, or monuments intended to communicate that certain political
minorities are inferior.108 After the purge of Tacoma, some citizens were
so brazen that they informed elected officials of exactly what they had
done. On May 4, 1885, John Arthur wrote Governor Squire and crowed,
“The Chinese are no more in Tacoma, and the trouble over them is virtually at an end.”109 This was no temporary state of affairs, he insisted,
but a permanent one: “Tacoma will be sans Chinese, sans pigtails, sans
moon-eye, sans wash-house, sans joss-house, sans everything Mongolian.”110
It is important to note that expulsion is logically connected to detention, since expulsion requires either explicit or implicit use of force to
gather and relocate human beings. Orders will have to be given and
some people can be expected to resist. The wartime internment of Japanese Americans during the 1940s illustrates this relationship, despite

105.
106.
107.
108.

Relyea, supra note 65.
Id.
See, e.g., PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 170–77.
See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (2018); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Charlottesville’s Monuments Are
Unconstitutional, SLATE (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2017/08/charlottesvilles-monuments-are-unconstitutional.html
[https://perma.cc/D856-BNXD].
109. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 222. Arthur then urged the governor to endorse a
petition to President Cleveland about “non-enforcement of the Chinese restriction act.”
Letter from John Arthur to Watson Squire, Wash. Territorial Governor (Nov. 4, 1885),
https://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom%20Materials
/Curriculum%20Packets/Asian%20Americans/Documents/28.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3ZV-U5W6].
110. PFAELZER, supra note 12, at 222.
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the Supreme Court’s bizarre effort to deny that expulsion and detention
were linked.111
Seizure is thus a necessary component of expulsion, but we can miss
the connection because the detentions entailed in a purge are often
temporary, requiring little architecture. In both Tacoma and Seattle,
groups of Chinese were gathered near the wharf and then moved
wholesale to ships or train stations or simply the city limits (p. 146). No
trace of the detentions remained after the Chinese had been run out of
town (p. 3). It’s only when other goals are paramount—a punitive objective, or perhaps the need to process the legal claims of detainees—that
more infrastructure is needed. At that point, detention becomes more
indefinite and visible.
The day may come when a type of expulsion is thought to be more
humane than detention. Lew-Williams’s picture of early border enforcement in the North after the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882 highlights this tension. She tells us that the first known acts of indefinite
immigrant detention occurred during this period, as unauthorized Chinese migrants were sent to the U.S. penitentiary on McNeil Island
(p. 85). No law explicitly allowed for this course of action, since imprisonment was not authorized for violating the restriction law (p. 85). U.S.
marshals simply began bringing captured migrants there, and those actions created a precedent that others found easiest to follow (p. 85).
Once they started detaining more migrants, however, new problems
cropped up. How long should they be detained? Who would decide?
What if you wanted to deport someone but no nation would take the
person?
Lew-Williams tells us that about 100 migrants were kept on McNeil
Island. Some were tried by local judges, who gave them a variety of sentences upon conviction. Many migrants were given six-month sentences,
but detainees were generally kept there awaiting trial, even after a sentence was finished, and those who didn’t get a trial were held until further instructions from the U.S. attorney general (pp. 84–86).
In a very real sense, America’s nineteenth-century lurch toward exclusion pushed us further down a path of complex detention. We are
now grappling with the fact that detention crosses over with other
forms of inequality. It involves, to some degree, separation from other
human beings; it can expose people to greater risk of other deprivations
and unequal treatment; and being detained for too long can lead to fairly predictable financial losses and psychological damage. Today, being
branded an “illegal immigrant”—a term that didn’t exist before the age

111. Justice Black’s decision in Korematsu insisted that the Court was considering
only orders to leave designated military areas, while the dissenters argued that the exclusion orders were part of a broader program to drive people of Japanese ancestry to
temporary relocation centers and then camps where they would be detained for a longer,
but indefinite, period. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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of exclusion112—can expose already vulnerable populations to further
social pain and sharply limit one’s future rights and opportunities.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese Must Go recovers an intense period during the nineteenth century when mostly white communities throughout the American West expelled Chinese migrants. In doing so, the book adds to our
existing understanding of racial and political violence in America. It also
fleshes out the cultural and political undercurrents that led to changes
in the country’s immigration laws and, in turn, spurred the development
of constitutional law inside and outside the courts.
There is good news here as well as bad. On the one hand, the plight
of the Chinese led to the clarification of birthright citizenship that brings
formal legal security to the children of migrants and the assurance of
some constitutional protections for noncitizens in America.113 On the
other hand, it also crystalized the idea of the border in the public imagination and initiated the apparatus of border control, spread a new rhetoric of “alien” noncitizens in our law and politics, and fostered
problematic justifications for extralegal methods to deal with undesirables. Lew-Williams calls this “the scaffolding of modern American gatekeeping” (p. 240). The legacy of these racial purges haunts us still.

112. John Hudson, Looking for the First Use of the Term ‘Illegal Immigrant,’ ATLANTIC
(Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/09/looking-firstuse-term-illegal-immigrant/323086/ [https://perma.cc/8AGQ-MMFE].
113. On birthright citizenship, see generally MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A
HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018); AYELET SHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009); Mae M. Ngai, Birthright
Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521 (2007); and Robert L. Tsai, The
Origins
of
Birthright
Citizenship,
BOS.
REV.
(Nov.
9,
2018),
http://bostonreview.net/race/robert-l-tsai-origins-birthright-citizenship
[https://perma.cc/B6BE-QS22].
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